Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies by Lawrence Lindsey
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies
Volume Author/Editor: Harvey S. Rosen, ed.




Chapter Title: Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: A Test of Public
Choice by Representative Government
Chapter Author: Lawrence Lindsey
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7886
Chapter pages in book: (p. 137 - 176)5  Federal Deductibility of  State 
and Local Taxes: 
A Test of Public Choice by 
Representative Government 
Lawrence B. Lindsey 
5.1  Introduction 
The recent tax  reform debate focused attention on the continued 
deductibility of state and local taxes in the calculation of federal taxable 
income. The original tax reform proposal by the Department of Trea- 
sury, issued in November 1984, called for the complete elimination of 
deductibility of state and local taxes. Later proposals by the president, 
the House of Representatives, and the Senate, maintained deductibility 
of nearly all state and local taxes. The final product of the tax reform 
debate, the Tax  Reform Act of  1986, maintained deductibility  of  all 
state and local taxes except for retail sales taxes. 
The deductibility of state and local taxes is a significant feature of 
fiscal federalism. Had deductibility of personal state and local taxes- 
retail  sales, personal  income, and  residential  property  taxes-been 
eliminated in 1983, federal income taxes would have been $30.4 billion 
higher. By contrast, total federal grants-in-aid to state and local gov- 
ernments were $86.2 billion that year. 
Unlike the direct grants-in-aid, the income tax saving from deduct- 
ibility does not accrue directly to state and local governments. Instead, 
it is received by individual taxpayers in the form of lower income tax 
liability. This is likely to affect state and local tax collections in two 
ways. First, local taxpayers have higher disposable income as a result 
of  deductibility. If  state and local public services are normal goods, 
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this  higher disposable income  will  lead to greater  demand  for such 
spending. Second, federal deductibility lowers the net cost to itemizing 
taxpayers of incremental dollars of state and local tax collections. This 
lower price on incremental public spending may also increase the quan- 
tity of public services demanded. 
Academic  investigation  of  this  issue has properly  focused on the 
“price”  effect. The entire tax saving from state and local tax deduct- 
ibility amounted to 1.25 percent of disposable personal income in 1983. 
On the other hand, deductibility lowered the price of incremental tax- 
ation for itemizers to 69 cents per dollar collected. Given these results, 
even modest price elasticities and large income elasticities are likely 
to show that price effects are dominant. This paper therefore follows 
the existing academic literature in focusing on price effects. 
Unlike ordinary price changes, changes in the price of local taxation 
do not translate directly through consumer optimization into changes 
in  the equilibrium quantity of  services demanded. The quantity and 
type of taxes and services are not determined by individual consumers 
but  by  collective decision-making apparatuses. The elasticity  of de- 
mand for public services therefore depends on the mechanism by which 
price changes are translated into changes in public policy. 
The dominant model of converting individual preferences into col- 
lective actions has been  the median voter model, first proposed by 
Hotelling (1929) and formally developed by Bowen (1943). In this model, 
the collective decision reflects the preferences of the swing or median 
voter. Half of  the remaining voters are assumed to want more of the 
given commodity, half less. A change in the price of local taxation for 
some voters will only affect the outcome if the price facing the median 
voter is changed, or if the ranking of  voters is changed in  a way so 
that the median voter becomes someone new. 
The median voter model places enormous stress on the capacity of 
representative governments to reflect voter preferences accurately. Rules 
controlling the election process, the setting of  the legislative agenda, 
and the process of coalition formation may  well  produce a different 
outcome than that preferred by  a majority of the voters. 
The present paper tests a number of different modes of public choice, 
focusing on the subject of state and local tax deductibility. Three issues 
are considered: the effect of deductibility on the level of state and local 
taxation, the effect of deductibility on the type of tax used at the state 
and local level, and the effect of proposed changes of federal tax rules 
regarding deductibility on congressional voting on tax reform. On each 
issue, a number of different methods for translating individual taxpayer 
preferences into collective decisions are tested. 
Section 5.2 below describes the theoretical issues involved and re- 
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in this analysis, and discusses its appropriateness to the issues at hand. 
The following section produces the results of the tests of various types 
of models of translating individual preferences into collective actions. 
The paper concludes with a brief summary of the findings. 
5.2  Theoretical Issues and Academic Findings 
Most academic investigations of the price elasticity of demand for 
locally  provided  public  services have relied  on the geographic vari- 
ability of the cost of public good provision, and the variations in the 
demographic makeup of communities.  There are two major explana- 
tions for this emphasis. The obvious reason is that the available data 
permit such a construct. The second reason is a theoretical  one: the 
reliance on the median voter model of public choice. 
Many  communities  rely  on the sequential  referendum method  of 
budgeting for local public goods, particularly education. Such referenda 
generally begin with a high proposed level of spending and reduce the 
figure in subsequent referenda until the budget proposal passes. This 
voting procedure lends itself nicely both to empirical testing and to the 
theoretical attraction of the median voter model. 
In practice, the median voter model requires a far more restrictive 
set of assumptions. The first is that there be a single public good in 
question so that logrolling and coalition formation do not dominate the 
voting procedure. This condition is arguably present in those referenda 
systems where the local public good in question is typically education. 
However, Bergstrom  and Goodman (1973) lay  out an extremely rig- 
orous set of assumptions needed to establish the result of a referendum 
as representative of the preferences of the median voter in the com- 
munity.  These include restrictive  assumptions on the income  distri- 
bution in the community and the price and income elasticities of demand 
for housing-a  necessary condition where local public spending is fi- 
nanced by taxation of residential real estate. 
Even laying aside the theoretical  problems  of establishing median 
voter criteria, there are a number of practical problems with the model. 
The first is the problem of agenda setting. If sequential referenda are 
not  guaranteed, or if  the change in  the amount of taxation  in  each 
referendum is substantial rather than marginal, it may be that the pref- 
erences of the median voter will not be realized. Romer and Rosenthal 
(1978) argued that the tendency for spending to revert to some sub- 
stantially lower level if a referendum were defeated would lead voters 
who prefer a modestly lower amount of  spending than that proposed 
to support the referendum.  They argued that this  procedure would 
produce a higher level of spending than that supported by the median 
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The process  of  voting is  also not free, especially given the time 
commitment necessary for the sequential referendum  process. Work 
by Rubinfeld (1980) tested for differences between voters and nonvo- 
ters. An earlier paper by Rubinfeld (1977) found that renters were less 
likely to vote  than  were  homeowners.  A  high  price  of  voting puts 
constraints  on the  sequential  referendum process,  and will  produce 
outcomes which are not consistent with the median voter hypothesis. 
Ladd  (1975)  showed  that  the  existence of  a  tax base  other than 
residential  real estate might produce  a higher level of  taxation. The 
existence of  commercial and industrial property in  the local tax base 
opens the possibility that the tax will be shifted forward in the form of 
higher prices, and not borne by the local residents. 
Gramlich and Galper (1973) investigated the use of grants by higher 
levels of government to subsidize local public goods and services. This 
can be a substantial issue. For example, federal grants-in-aid to states 
and municipalities in  1983 exceeded collections from  state personal 
income taxes that year. Gramlich concluded that many grants produce 
corner solutions and thus affect the income or wealth of the community 
but not the marginal price of  public services. 
These issues are of consequence in  the present paper as well. The 
issues of  differential voting patterns, shifting of business taxes, and 
grants-in-aid, are all dealt with explicitly. This paper also raises a fur- 
ther practical objection to the median voter model: that the functioning 
of  representative governments is quite different from the  sequential 
referendum procedure in determining the level of spending. 
The representative system offers the potential for greater economic 
efficiency in determining the level of municipal spending than does the 
median voter model. One clear fault of the median voter model is that, 
if it works, it is unlikely to produce the efficient level of public services. 
Samuelson’s condition that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution 
for the residents equal the marginal rate of transformation requires that 
the mean  demand for public  services, not  the  tastes of  the  median 
demander, be  reflected  in  the outcome. Representative government 
offers the possibility that majoritarian  outcomes may  yield to more 
economically efficient outcomes such as those favored by the “omni- 
scient” planner. This possibility is explicitly tested in the present paper. 
This paper uses the federal tax deductibility of state and local taxes 
as the basis for empirical investigation.  Studies designed to estimate 
the demand for state and local services based on tax deductibility have 
been fairly recent. Zimmerman (1983) uses an explicit median voter 
model to determine the demand for public goods. His analysis assumes 
that the median voter and the median income household in  the state 
are synonymous. This is equivalent to assuming that all taxpayers have 
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manded is the result of price differences. The fact that a median income 
family is unlikely to itemize drives Zimmerman’s conclusion that fed- 
eral deductibility has no effect on state and local spending. 
Hettich and Winer (1984) examined the share of state taxes derived 
from the personal income tax in  the context of federal deductibility. 
Their results on the deductibility variable has the wrong sign, meaning 
that greater deductibility leads to a lower share of income taxes in total 
taxes. Their study has a number of statistical flaws. Furthermore, some 
of their findings on tax sources’ own price and cross-price elasticities 
are counterintuitive. Nonetheless, their public choice model of  max- 
imization subject to political constraints may well be appropriate. 
Inman (1985) examined 41  large cities over the period  1960 to 1980 
using an estimate of  the average federal tax price prevailing locally. 
Like Hettich and Winer, Inman reports counterintuitive signs for cross- 
price elasticities between property and income and sales taxes. Again, 
an implicit median voter model was used to calculate tax prices. In- 
comes at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of local incomes were 
applied to the national probability  of  itemizing at those incomes to 
obtain a federal tax price. 
Feldstein  and Metcalf (1987) substantially  remedied  the  problems 
with estimating federal tax price.  They used the National Bureau of 
Economic Research TAXSIM model  to calculate the  probability  of 
itemizing and the tax rates faced by itemizers in each state. The highly 
disaggregated data provided by TAXSIM allowed the construction of 
instrumental variables to avoid the problems of statistical endogeneity 
between tax collections and tax price. They find very high elasticities 
of  demand for deductible personal taxes with respect to after federal 
tax price. Feldstein and Metcalf’s parameter estimates generally have 
very large standard errors, but the robustness of the results with respect 
to model specification lends support to their findings. 
Feldstein and Metcalf experiment with three measures of deduct- 
ibility: the average tax  price facing itemizers and nonitemizers, the 
proportion of taxpayers itemizing, and the tax price facing itemizers. 
They find that the decomposition of the weighted average tax price into 
its  two components,  the  proportion  of  taxpayers  itemizing and the 
itemizers’ price, has no substantial effect on their conclusions. 
The present paper takes Feldstein and Metcalf as a starting point for 
analysis, but has a different methodological emphasis. While Feldstein 
and Metcalf sought a quantitative estimate of the elasticity of state and 
local  spending with  respect  to tax  price, this paper focuses on the 
mechanism by which the tax price facing individuals is translated into 
a collective decision, although the present text also quantifies the effect 
of federal deductibility on state and local tax collections. Several dif- 
ferent models of state and local legislative behavior are considered. 142  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
First, this paper considers the appropriateness of modeling the ex- 
penditure  process as representing  the wishes of the electorate. This 
requires a departure from the Feldstein-Metcalf approach, to use the 
voter, rather than the taxpayer, as the unit of analysis. There are two 
key differences between  voters and taxpayers. First, taxpayers may 
be family units consisting of more than one voter. Married taxpayers 
who file a joint return are counted as a single taxpayer by the IRS and 
on the TAXSIM file. On the other hand, such taxpaying units are likely 
to have two qualified voters in them. Second, survey evidence suggests 
that voting is positively correlated with income. Data from exit polls 
following the 1984 election’ was used to  estimate the likelihood of each 
tax return producing a voter. 
For examination  of voter-based  models, this analysis adopts, with 
some modification, two of the Feldstein and Metcalf indicators of tax 
price: average tax price for all taxpayers and proportion of taxpayers 
itemizing. The first indicator assumes that the price facing each voter 
is weighted equally in the legislative process. In the standard version 
of  this model, the price facing nonitemizing voters is unity while the 
price facing itemizing voters is unity less the value of their tax deduc- 
tion. The sum of the prices facing all voters is divided by the number 
of voters to obtain the average price. This measure of price will  be 
termed the  “average  price facing voters”  (APFV) model. This is  a 
more complex version of the median voter model. In that model, all 
voters are ranked by price and the median voter selected as represen- 
tative. This model weights the price facing all voters equally, including 
the prices facing inframarginal voters. 
The second voter-based  model is the naive deductibility model, or 
naive write-off (NWO) model. This model assumes that taxpayers only 
care about whether they can write something off, without regard to the 
value of the income tax deduction. Although seemingly irrational to 
public finance economists, this model is in keeping with survey data 
suggesting that the great majority of the public do  not know the marginal 
tax rate they face. This model is essentially identical to the proportion- 
itemizing model of Feldstein and Metcalf. 
The final Feldstein and Metcalf  model-average  price facing item- 
izers-is  not considered here.  Such a model would be appropriate to 
a dominant party arrangement where itemizers were the dominant party, 
selected their median price in a primary election in which only itemizers 
could vote, and then carried that choice to victory in an election decided 
strictly by itemizer status. 
Unlike  Feldstein and Metcalf,  the present paper also considers a 
planner model of public decision making. In this model, the legislative 
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lective well being. Here, the price of taxation is the weighted average 
price of taxes. To compute this weighted average price, the tax saving 
due to deductibility of a tax is divided by the total revenue collected 
from that tax. This fraction is then subtracted from unity to obtain the 
weighted average price to the state of  collecting a particular tax. 
Unconstrained, the planner model would levy taxes on the taxpayer 
with the lowest postfederal tax price first, until that taxpayer was pushed 
to a higher tax price. Then all taxpayers at the higher tax price would 
be taxed until they were pushed to the next higher tax price. Such a 
model would maximize the federal share of the total cost of the revenue 
collected. States might be constrained in adopting extreme versions of 
this approach because of  the mobility of  high federal income tax rate 
voters. 
The adoption of this model required consideration of the Feldstein- 
Metcalf arguments regarding endogenously determined prices. A spec- 
ification of the effect of prices on taxes is given by  equation (1): 
(1)  Ti = a. +  a, Yi  + a, Pi  + a3  Zj +  ui. 
In this model, T is per capita tax collections, Y,  per capita income, Z, 
a vector of demographic attributes of the state, and P, some measure 
of prices facing voters. 
Ordinary least  squares will produce unbiased parameter estimates 
only if values of ui  are independent of price and income. There are two 
reasons to suspect such independence. First, higher levels of taxation 
will increase the likelihood that taxpayers will itemize, thus depressing 
the price variable. Second, among itemizers, as taxes are increased, 
the taxpayer  is pushed  into lower tax  brackets, thus increasing the 
value of  the price variable. 
Feldstein and Metcalf choose three instrumental variables to avoid 
this problem. The first is the “first-dollar price” which is computed by 
excluding state and local tax deductions from the itemizer calculus. A 
marginal tax rate is then assigned to each return from the tax table as 
is the probability of  itemizing based on the national proportion of tax- 
payers itemizing at the taxpayer’s income level. The second instrument 
is constructed in the same manner as the first, except that the national 
average amount of  state and local tax deductions for the taxpayer’s 
income class replaces the taxpayer’s actual deduction before the mar- 
ginal tax rate is computed. The third instrument is the proportion of 
taxpayers in the state who would be expected to itemize if each tax- 
payer’s probability of itemizing was equal to the national average for 
his adjusted gross income class. 
The case for such an instrumental variables approach relies on the 
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federal tax price and induces a negative correlation between the price 
variable and the stochastic disturbance. Such a situation would over- 
state the magnitude of a negative price elasticity. 
This paper adopts two of these instruments, with some modification, 
and omits the third. The first-dollar price is computed for each of the 
three measures of price by eliminating the state and local tax deduction 
before computing the taxpayer’s itemizer status or tax rate. This first- 
dollar price is then used as the first instrumental measure of the actual 
price. 
Feldstein and Metcalf’s second measure is to substitute the average 
state and local deduction in each taxpayer’s income class for the actual 
deduction claimed by that taxpayer. This instrument seems appropriate 
for some classes of taxpayers, but not for others. On the one hand, 
this measure is appropriate for taxpayers who will itemize regardless 
of  their level of  state and local taxes. Substitution of the national av- 
erage level of state and local tax deduction for the actual level eliminates 
the simultaneity between tax rate and the level of deductions for tax- 
payers whose itemizer status is not dependent on their level of state 
and local deductions. 
On the other hand, for taxpayers whose itemizer status depends on 
their level of deductions, the Feldstein-Metcalf method of calculating 
the instrument may be inappropriate. The key issue is whether or not 
the taxpayer’s deductions are above or below the national average for 
his or her  income  class.  In  the case of  taxpayers  who have  above 
average levels of state and local deductions, no problem exists. Sub- 
stituting the average level of such deductions for the actual level implies 
lowering the level of deductions claimed by  that taxpayer.  Some of 
these taxpayers may become nonitemizers as a result. For these tax- 
payers,  with  above average state and local deductions,  the average 
level of deductions properly instruments their itemizer status. 
But, this instrument is not symmetric for taxpayers with below av- 
erage state and local deductions. For these taxpayers, substituting the 
average level of such deductions for the taxpayer’s actual level implies 
raising the total deductions claimed by  the taxpayer.  Some of  these 
taxpayers should switch from being nonitemizers to being itemizers as 
a result. But, because no data exist on their deductions, simply adding 
the average level of deductions to their existing deduction level of zero 
will  not  properly  instrument  their  itemizer  status.  The result  is  an 
underestimate of the number of itemizers in states with below average 
levels of taxes. This underestimate produces a measure of price which 
is too high in states with low levels of taxes. As a result, it is likely to 
underestimate the sensitivity of taxes to tax price. 
The present study mitigates this problem by determining an estimate 
of  non-state  and local tax deductions for these taxpayers. This is ac- 
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deductions for taxpayers in each income group who would not itemize 
in the absence of the state and local tax deduction. These taxpayers 
are assigned a level of non-state  and local tax deductions based on this 
distribution using a Monte Carlo procedure. The average level of state 
and local tax deductions is then added to the synthetic level of non- 
state and local deductions to determine the taxpayer’s itemizer status 
and tax rate. 
The third instrument used by Feldstein and Metcalf, determining the 
tax price based solely on the state’s income distribution, is not used. 
This instrument, by  substituting a national average measure of  price 
for the actual state price, may be omitting a facto;which  is uncorrelated 
with the tastes for spending, but is correlated with the actual price in 
the state. For example, the state of Utah has the highest proportion of 
itemizers of any state in the union. The probable reason for this is that 
the dominant religious group in the state, the Latter Day Saints, prac- 
tices tithing with regard to their charitable contributions. Substituting 
a nationally determined instrument for itemizing behavior will overstate 
the price of taxes in Utah, even though tastes for state spending and 
for Mormonism are uncorrelated. 
Thus, for the voter model, two instruments were selected for each 
of  the two measures of price. For the planner model of  behavior, the 
same kind of instruments were computed for the weighted average price 
of each tax. Federal taxes were calculated for taxpayers in each state 
with the deduction for the particular tax in question removed. This 
zero deduction level of  federal taxes was compared with the regular 
level of federal taxes to calculate the saving from the deductibility of 
the particular type of taxes. The saving was divided by the total state 
tax collection from the tax, from itemizers and nonitemizers alike, and 
the resulting ratio subtracted from unity to obtain a price. 
In the case of  the first-dollar price instrument, only the deductions 
of  taxpayers who would itemize in the absence of  the state and local 
tax deductions were considered in computing the saving. In the case 
of the second instrument, only the deductions for taxpayers who were 
considered itemizers were considered in computing the saving. In both 
cases, the denominator of the measure of price, total state tax collec- 
tions, was unaffected. 
The price thus obtained was the average price of collecting revenue 
from the tax. Except in the case of taxpayers who switched tax brackets 
as a result of the deduction, this is the same as the marginal price of 
collecting the tax. This measure of price differs from the others con- 
sidered in that it weights the marginal price faced by each taxpayer by 
the amount of the tax that taxpayer paid. 
The contrast between  the voter models and the planner model is 
based on a choice of perception of the political process as derivative 
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In the case of  the state and local legislative process, the dependent 
variables in the exercise are the level and composition of  state taxes. 
A similar contrast  of  models can be made at the federal  level.  The 
voting of  congressional delegations on the tax reform bill is modeled 
as functions of both a direct voting procedure by taxpayers and by the 
impact of the tax reform on the state overall. 
The direct voting measure of  support for the tax  reform bill  was 
computed using the NBER TAXSIM program to conduct a “referen- 
dum” among voters. Voters who saw their taxes reduced by at least 
0.2 percent of income were assumed to vote yes, while those who saw 
their taxes increased by at least 0.2 percent of  income were assumed 
to vote no. The voting results were calculated by state for comparison 
with the vote of the state’s congressional delegation. 
The planner model of congressional behavior is based on the effect 
of the tax reform bill on the total federal taxes paid by the state. In 
this case, congressmen may be assumed to ignore the will of the ma- 
jority in the referendum if  the impact on the state was adverse. The 
ratio of  new to old federal taxes paid  by  the state was used as the 
independent variable. 
Both models of congressional behavior also provide a means to check 
on the importance of  federal deductibility of state and local taxes in 
the delegation’s set of  preferences.  State and local elected officials, 
together with municipal employee organizations, are known to be a 
potent and organized political force. If the rise in the price of state and 
local revenue collections is indeed a serious matter, congressional vot- 
ing on the tax reform bill should reflect that fact. The various measures 
of the cost of state and local revenue before and after tax reform are 
therefore entered as independent variables in the congressional voting 
equations. 
Three sets of tests of the importance of federal deductibility of state 
and local taxes emerge. First, how does the deductibility  affect the 
level of state and local tax collections? Second, how does deductibility 
affect the mix of taxes used to collect revenues? Finally, was the rise 
in the price of state and local tax collections (no matter how measured) 
of sufficient importance to affect congressional voting on the tax reform 
bill? The next section considers the issues involved in generating the 
data to examine these questions. 
5.3  Sources and Construction of the Data Base 
The data used in this study come from two primary sources, Facts 
and Figures on Government Finance, prepared by the Tax Foundation, 
and  simulations  performed  using the National  Bureau  of  Economic 
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aggregate levels of tax collection, by  source, for each state. The latter 
source was used to calculate the level of itemized deductions and the 
price of revenue for each revenue source, by state. Data for 1983 were 
used both for revenue collection and for tax simulation purposes. 
5.3.1  Deductibility of Nonpersonal Taxes 
In 1983, state and local governments collected $487 billion, or $2,080 
per capita. Of  this, $385 per capita, or about 18  percent, represented 
transfer payments from the federal government. An additional $480 per 
capita represented various charges and miscellaneous sources of rev- 
enue, while $1,216 was collected in direct taxes for each person. This 
latter figure includes personal  taxes such as personal  income, retail 
sales, and residential real estate taxes, as well as direct taxes on busi- 
nesses such as corporate profits taxes and taxes on commercial and 
industrial real estate. These direct forms of taxation constituted only 
about 60 percent of all state and local revenue. 
Personal taxes made up about three-fifths of  these direct taxes, so 
that typically, only 36 percent of state revenues came from direct per- 
sonal taxes. Map 5.1 shows the importance of  personal taxes in each 
state. Personal taxes are most important in the industrial states of the 
Northeast and Midwest, plus California. On the other hand, personal 
taxes are least important in the resource extraction states. Severance 
taxes are particularly significant in Alaska, Texas, and Louisiana, and 
the surface coal mining states of Montana, Wyoming, and the Dakotas. 
The net cost to state residents of these various types of revenue is 
an issue subject to a substantial amount of interpretation. For example, 
aid from the federal government was treated as exogenous to the price 
of raising state and local taxes for the purposes of this study. However, 
a significant amount of  federal aid is in the form of  matching grants 
which requires some spending by the state or locality. This matching 
may alter the effect of differences in the cost of raising revenue. How- 
ever, the benefits of matching are separable from the benefits of  sub- 
sidized  tax  revenue  since  matching  is  done  based  on  the  gross 
expenditures of the municipality and not on the net-of-federal-tax cost 
of raising the money for those expenditures. The assumption of  exo- 
geneity of  federal aid programs is therefore appropriate. In this con- 
clusion we are largely following the findings of Gramlich (1977). 
The various charges levied by the states and municipalities are also 
subject to interpretation  regarding the  appropriate  measure of  their 
cost. Fees which are levied on the basis of use, rather than wealth or 
income, are not deductible from the federal personal income tax. Water 
bills and highway tolls fit into this category. However, the bulk of these 
charges are borne, at the level of first incidence, by business. These 
fees include utilities taxes, airport use fees, highway use charges, and Map 5.1  Personal taxes as a share of revenue. (Map by Andy Mitrusi) 149  Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes 
severance taxes.  To  the extent that  these taxes are passed  along in 
product prices, the effect on business profits, and on the net cost of 
raising the revenue,  is nil. This fact makes a case for assuming no 
federal offset in the cost of raising these taxes. 
However, the final consumers who bear the incidence of these taxes 
may be found in a diffuse national market. Such a conclusion would 
represent a case for a municipality to view the levying of such taxes 
as a “free”  good since nonresidents would pay the tax. Ladd (1975) 
investigates this hypothesis. 
The possibility that firms may be mobile produces a Tiebout model 
of location at the firm level. A municipality which is small relative to 
the national market might therefore view increments to business taxes 
as falling on land rents. To the extent that these taxes are levied by all 
municipalities, there will  be no diminution of local land rents, since 
there  is no change  in  relative  location  values. This  study therefore 
models these taxes in a two-step procedure. First, a base amount equal 
to the state’s revenue from these other sources up to 80 percent of the 
50-state average is viewed as passed through to final consumers and 
therefore nondeductible at the federal level. The excess over this amount 
is viewed as deductible at the federal corporate rate. 
Taxes paid  by  corporations to states and localities are deductible 
against the federal corporation income tax. This reduces the net cost 
of the state tax payment if the corporation has positive profits. If the 
corporation does not have positive profits, the effect of the state taxes 
paid is to increase the loss carryforward of the corporation. When the 
corporation returns to profitability these losses will  then be used  to 
offset profits and tax liability. It is not clear from the available data 
how much state and local taxes are paid by  taxable corporations and 
how much by corporations not subject to tax. This study assumes that 
state corporate income taxes are fully deductible, since profitability at 
the state level implies profitability at the federal level. The Sraristics 
oflncome shows that roughly 80 percent of total sales were made by 
taxable corporations  in  1983. This  study therefore  assumes  that  80 
percent of business taxes are deductible. 
The available data does not specify the source of property tax rev- 
enue. However, the Census of  Governments provides data on the gross 
assessed value of locally assessed taxable real property in each state. 
This study apportioned total property tax collections in proportion to 
assessed values. Residential real  estate was assumed to be taxed  to 
individuals while commercial and industrial real estate plus vacant land 
was assumed to be taxed to corporations. This neglects the fact that 
some residential real estate is owned by  corporations and that some 
commercial and industrial real estate is owned by proprietorships and 
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5.3.2  Personal Taxes 
The three major sources of  personal tax revenues are personal in- 
come taxes,  sales taxes, and  property  taxes. As  mentioned  above, 
residential property was assumed to be owned by individuals and real 
estate taxes on such property deducted at the individual level. Indi- 
vidual income and sales taxes required no such apportionment. 
Map 5.2 shows which of these taxes is the primary source of personal 
tax revenue in each of the states. As the map clearly shows, the largest 
source of personal taxes is the retail sales tax, being the dominant tax 
in 25 states. Property taxes dominate in 10 states while personal income 
taxes  are the dominant form  of  personal  taxation in  15  states. The 
regional variation is quite marked. Sales taxes are the most popular in 
the South and West. Income taxes dominate in the East, except for 
New  England  where  residential  property  taxes  generate  the  most 
revenue. 
The deductibility of  these personal  taxes depends on the itemizer 
status of the taxpayer, and the value of the deduction depends on the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.  In order to compute these values, the 
National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model was used. This 
computerized model, like similar models at the Department of Treasury 
and the Joint  Committee on Taxation relies on a large data base of 
actual tax returns. For this study, the 1983 Individual Tax  Model File 
Public Use Sample was used. This data base contains a stratified ran- 
dom sample of roughly 120,000 individual tax returns for 1983. Because 
of  cost considerations, a one in  four random sample of  the data was 
used. 
The TAXSIM routine calculates the itemizer status, tax liability, and 
marginal tax rate of  each taxpayer by simulating the effect of the tax 
law on the data contained on the taxpayer’s tax return. Values for 1983 
were computed based on the tax law and tax rates prevailing in that 
year. 
In order to simulate the effect of the new tax law, the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, the 1988 version of that law was selected. The dollar values 
contained in that version were deflated to 1983 levels using the esti- 
mated change in the consumer price index between those years. Thus, 
the tax brackets, standard deduction, and personal exemptions all re- 
flected the real value of their actual 1988 levels evaluated in 1983. The 
effect of the new law was then simulated in the same manner as the 
old law, with a new itemizer status, tax liability, and marginal tax rate 
for each taxpayer. 
The Individual Tax Model File contains state identifiers for all tax- 
payers with incomes under $200,000. State identifiers are withheld from 
the top bracket taxpayers  in  order to protect  confidentiality. These 
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filed in 1983. Thus, for measures which weighted all taxpayers equally, 
such as those used by Feldstein and Metcalf, neglect of the top bracket 
taxpayers was of little consequence. However, these taxpayers pay 
state and local taxes, particularly income taxes, out of proportion to 
their numbers. Thus, a weighted average measure of the price of raising 
state and local revenue must include the effect of deductibility on these 
taxpayers. 
To accomplish this, the distribution among the states of income for 
taxpayers earning over $200,000 was computed from the 1981 Statistics 
ofIncome. (This was the last SOI to include a state-by-state  breakdown 
by income class.) The national aggregate values for the income and tax 
data from the 1983 Individual Tax Model File were apportioned among 
the states using this data. This high-income data was then added to the 
data for taxpayers with incomes under $200,000 to obtain a state-by- 
state total level of taxes, deductions, and income. 
5.3.3  Other Measures 
The TAXSIM  program automatically  converts the number of tax- 
payer files it studies into a representative number of actual taxpayers 
by using a sample weight from the taxpayer file. The analysis done in 
this paper was not done by tax return, however, but by voter. Given 
the objective of measuring the importance of public sentiment, this is 
a key transformation. TAXSIM assigned a number of voters to each 
tax return using the income and marital status of the household filing 
the return based  on data drawn from  exit  polls following  the  1984 
election. 
The probability of voting varies most significantly with income class. 
The data showed that 29 percent of eligible persons with incomes under 
$5,000 vote, as  do 40 percent with incomes between $5,000 and $10,000, 
45 percent with incomes between $10,000 and $20,000,66 percent with 
incomes between  $20,000 and $30,000, 74 percent with  incomes be- 
tween $30,000 and $40,000 and 85 percent with incomes over $40,000. 
The adjusted  gross income  of elderly  taxpayers was  augmented  by 
$6,000 for single returns and $10,000 for joint returns with two elderly 
exemptions in order to calculate the likelihood of taxpayers on those 
returns voting. Tax returns filed using single taxpayer, head of house- 
hold, and married filing separately filing status were assumed to rep- 
resent a single potential voter. Tax returns filed by married taxpayers 
filing  jointly were assumed to have two potential voters. The probability 
of voting given the income class of the taxpayer was multiplied by the 
number of potential voters in the household to assign an actual number 
of voters to each tax return. 
The calculations  done on deductibility  and price  used  these new 
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culated as itemizing if  the total deductions claimed on the return ex- 
ceeded  the  standard  deduction  for  the  tax  law  being  simulated. 
Households which itemize face lower prices than those which do not. 
These taxpayers are therefore more likely to favor state and local public 
spending than are other households. 
Map 5.3 shows the proportion of  voters itemizing in each state. The 
earlier study by Feldstein and Metcalf found that nonitemizers filed a 
majority of the tax returns in each state. As married couples are more 
likely to itemize than nonmarried  individuals and as higher income 
taxpayers are more likely both to itemize and to vote, their finding is 
reversed with the use of this measure. Nonitemizers are a majority of 
voters in 22 states while itemizers dominate in 28. Higher-income states 
clearly tend to have more itemizers than do lower-income states. 
Separate  calculations  were  done to find  the  average  price  facing 
itemizers and the cost of  all state and local tax deductions. For these 
variables, the values for all state and local taxes were set to zero and 
taxes recomputed. The price of state and local taxation  facing each 
itemizer was the difference between his taxes with and without his tax 
deduction divided by the amount of state and local taxes claimed. The 
total  change in taxes for all  itemizers was divided by  total  personal 
taxes collected to obtain a weighted average price of collecting personal 
taxes. 
The average price of  revenue facing voters, the APFV measure of 
price, was computed by  averaging the prices faced by itemizers, mul- 
tiplying this figure by the proportion of the state’s voters who itemized, 
and adding the proportion of the state’s voters who did not itemize. 
Map 5.4 shows this average price measure in the various states. Again, 
poorer states have higher prices of revenue than do richer states. The 
lowest prices  are found in the industrial parts of  the Northeast  and 
Midwest while the highest prices are found in the South. 
The average price of  revenue differs from the average price facing 
voters in that it weights each taxpayer’s price by the amount of taxes 
that taxpayer paid. The average price of revenue is generally lower 
than the average price facing voters because higher-income taxpayers, 
with lower prices, are likely to pay an above average portion of the 
state’s taxes. The average price of revenue, known as the weighted 
average price (WAP), is shown in  map 5.5.  The same basic regional 
pattern emerges for this measure of price as for the earlier measures 
of price. 
5.4  Econometric Results 
The objective of this research was to test the mechanism by which 
state and  local tax  deductibility  affects  decision  making by  elected Map 5.3  Voters itemizing under old law. (Map by Andy Mitmsi) Map 5.4  Average price of revenue facing voters under old law. (Map 
by Andy Mitrusi) Map 5.5  Average  price  of  revenue  under  old  law.  (Map by  Andy 
Mitrusi) 
Map 5.5  Average  price  of  revenue  under  old  law.  (Map by  Andy 
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representatives. Three sets of tests are considered. First, how much, 
and by what mechanism, are state and local decision makers influenced 
by  deductibility in  setting the level of taxes. Second, how much, and 
by what mechanism, are state and local decision makers influenced by 
deductibility in setting the type of taxes levied? Third, did state congres- 
sional delegations take account of the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 on the cost of  raising state and local revenue? Each question is 
considered in turn. 
5.4.1 
To test the relationship between deductibility and the level of taxes, 
a reduced form equation was specified with the per capita level of taxes 
as the  dependent variable.  Independent  variables  included  personal 
income per capita, price, and other forms of revenue. Since no single 
specification is structurally related to the decision making process, a 
variety of definitions of the variables were tried. The general form of 
the specification is given by equation (2): 
(2) 
In this case T represents the per capita level of  taxes collected in the 
state, Y, the per capita level of personal income, P, the price of revenue, 
R, the level of per capita revenue from exogenous sources, and D is 
a vector of demographic characteristics of the state designed to capture 
tastes for public expenditure. 
Absent the demographic variables, the expected results would in- 
clude positive values for the income coefficient, 6,.  In linear form, the 
income coefficient tells the fraction of each additional dollar of personal 
income which would  be  taken in  taxes.  The demographic  variables 
used  to control for tastes are often correlated with income.  Absent 
these taste considerations, which also to some extent reflect the costs 
of  public  service provision, there  is no particular  reason  to expect 
higher state and local taxes in higher income states. 
The coefficient on the price term, 62, describes how federal deduct- 
ibility influences the level of taxes collected. Greater deductibility low- 
ers the price of raising revenue. If b2  is negative, as expected, this will 
imply greater state and local  revenue collections as a result  of  de- 
ductibility. Three measures of price are tried. The first is the proportion 
of taxpayers who are not itemizers. This is the naive write-off model 
of  deductibility  since it implies that itemizers only consider the fact 
that state and local taxes are deductible, not the amount of tax saving 
such deductibility entails. The second price measure is the average 
price facing voters. This measure assigns a price of unity to nonitem- 
izers and unity minus the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate to itemizers. All 
voters are counted equally in  computing the average price. The final 
Deductibility and the Level of Taxes 
Ti =  6, + 6,  Y; + 62  P; + 6+Ri  + b4  Dj + e,. 158  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
measure is the weighted average price of taxes which weights the prices 
facing each  voter by  the amount of  personal  taxes each  pays. This 
measure is designed to test the planner model of representative be- 
havior. No individual voter should care about the amount of taxes paid 
by  other voters, and hence the weighted average price. But, decision 
makers who evaluate the net cost of revenue to the state as whole, 
and not to individual voters, should use the weighted average measure. 
In some specifications, a weighted average price of revenue, including 
business taxes, was also tried. As discussed in the previous section, 
two instrumental  variables were used for each of these measures of 
price: one representing the first-dollar price and the second representing 
the tax price if the average level of  state and local taxes is assigned. 
The existence of other revenue sources should influence the level of 
taxation in the state. For example, states which levy severance taxes 
on natural resource extraction, or which run very successful state lot- 
teries, might be  expected to use this revenue to reduce taxes on the 
residents. Grants-in-aid from the federal government should substitute 
for locally raised revenue. As a result, the expected sign on the other 
revenue coefficient, b3,  is negative. A number of  definitions of  other 
revenue are tried to see if  some forms of revenue affect state and local 
tax collections differently from other sources of  revenue. 
In order to control for the role of tastes in determining the level of 
state and local taxation, a series of demographic variables were used. 
In the tables which follow, PUPILS represents the ratio of students in 
school to the state’s total population, ROAD indicates road mileage 
per  capita, NONWHITE is the proportion of  the  state’s population 
which was nonwhite in the 1980 census, URBAN is the proportion of 
the state’s population living in  urban areas in  1980, POVERTY is the 
percentage of the state’s population below the poverty line, and EL- 
DERLY is the percentage of the state’s population over age 65. Finally, 
HOME0  WN  represents the percentage of the state’s population living 
in a home they own. 
Two independent variables are tried, personal taxes per capita and 
personal plus business taxes per capita. A comparison of  the regres- 
sions done on just personal taxes with those done on personal  plus 
business taxes shows the amount of substitutability between these taxes. 
The results of  these regressions are presented in tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
Table 5.1 shows the regression results when personal taxes per capita 
is the dependent variable while table 5.2 presents the results when the 
dependent variable is personal and business taxes per capita. The first 
set of regressions ignored the effect of other sources of revenue on tax 
collections, while the second set of regressions  included federal aid 
and interest receipts per capita, and the third set of regressions included 159  Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes 
Table 5.1  Regression Results for Personal Taxes per Capita Using Various Measures 
of Price 
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Table 5.2  Regression Results for Personal and Business Taxes per Capita Using 
Various Measures of  Price 
Measure of  Price 










































-  1.93 
-  33* 
21 










-  40* 
31 












-  40* 
-  23* 
2076 
0.05* 





~  27* 
36 










-  34* 
44 









-  4.42 
-  34* 
44 







~  33* 
25 
-  24* 








-  669 
-2.59 











-  1.22 
-  40* 
34 
-  24' 
0.636 
-  23* 
6203* 
0.02 
-  4888* 
44 
0.16 
-  0.56 
-4.43 
-  29* 
33 









-  35* 
40 
-  26* 
0.699 









-  35* 
39 








-  1.38 























-  39* 
29 









-  1.83 











-  0.29 
~  40* 
31 










-  39* 
30 
-  23* 
0.638 
Nore: An (*) indicates significance at the 95 percent confidence interval. 
federal aid, interest, and other nontax revenue per capita as a dependent 
variable. 
Six different price measures were used, representing two different 
instruments for each of three different prices. The naive write-off model 
is indicated by NWO, the average price facing voters by  APFV, and 161  Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes 
the weighted average price by WAP.  For each price, the first measure 
uses  the  first-dollar method  of  instrumenting the variable  while the 
second measure uses the imputed  national average technique.  Both 
techniques are described in the previous section. 
The results strongly suggest that the first-dollar measure of price is 
inferior to the imputed national average measure, particularly in the 
two voter-based models-NWO  and APFV. In all of  the regressions 
using these measures of price, R2 was substantially lower using the 
first-dollar price than when the imputed national average technique was 
used. In addition, the price variable was consistently statistically sig- 
nificant using the second instrument but never significant using the first 
instrument. 
A likely reason for this is that the first-dollar technique ignores the 
effect of  the state and local tax deduction on the probability of item- 
izing. Actual decisions regarding the level of state and local spending 
are likely to be marginal, with little likelihood of affecting a voter’s 
price or itemizing status. The first-dollar instrument calculates price 
on the extreme assumption that the taxpayer has no state and local tax 
deduction. While roughly half the voters actually itemize their deduc- 
tions, the first-dollar method estimates that less than one-third do. The 
relationship  between  the proportion  itemizing under  the first-dollar 
method and the proportion actually itemizing may be monotonic, but 
it is likely to be quite complex and certainly not linear. The first-dollar 
measure therefore is a poor instrument. 
The data also show that the voter-based models, NWO and APFV, 
are much better at estimating the level of  personal taxes than is the 
planner model using the WAP  measure of  price. The R2 measure of 
explanatory power shows that the WAP measure is no better than the 
first-dollar price measure in the voter-based models. Furthermore, no 
statistically significant relationship between price and the level of tax- 
ation is found using the WAP measure of price. 
This evidence strongly supports the conclusion that deductibility of 
state and local taxes affects the level of  state and local spending in a 
rather egalitarian manner. It seems that the number of voters affected 
by deductibility is the primary determinant of support for higher state 
and local spending. Legislatures seem to take very little account of the 
actual aggregate cost to the state of raising additional revenue, except 
as it affects the cost faced by typical voters. 
Under the NWO model, a switch from having all voters itemize to 
that in which no voters may itemize would lower personal taxes per 
capita by about $1,200. Stated in a more realistic context, a decrease 
in the fraction of voters itemizing of one percentage point would lower 
personal taxes per capita by $12. This is a very dramatic result. Personal 
taxes per capita averaged less than $1,000 in  1983, with roughly half 162  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
of all voters itemizing. An extension of this parameter to the extreme 
worlds of universal deductibility and no deductibility suggest that tax 
collections would vary from $400 with no deductibility to $1,600 with 
universal deductibility. 
Three  important  caveats  should  be  placed  on  this interpretation. 
First, it is always dangerous to extrapolate parameters estimated from 
relatively small cross-sectional differences to extreme situations. Sec- 
ond, such  extrapolation is particularly  inappropriate if  majoritarian 
decision processes are involved. Given the current state of between 
40 percent and 60 percent of  voters itemizing, each one percentage 
point change in the number of itemizers is likely to have a major impact 
on the outcome of an election. Such an impact would necessarily be 
diminished in situations where less than 30 or more than 70 percent of 
the voters itemized. Third, it is important to keep in mind that a re- 
duction in personal taxes does not necessarily mean an equal reduction 
in spending. Revenue sources such as user charges would become both 
more economically rational and more politically popular when federal 
deductibility of other revenue sources is eliminated. 
The results from the APFV model reinforce the findings from the 
NWO regressions. In these regressions, a rise in  the APFV measure 
of price by one percentage point reduces personal taxes by  about $4,200. 
More realistically, this measure says that a one percentage point rise 
in the average price of taxation for the typical voter reduces personal 
taxes by $42. It is important to consider the determinants of the APFV 
measure. First, if  the proportion of itemizers falls by one percentage 
point, the APFV measure of price rises only by the itemizers’ marginal 
tax  rate.  Thus, a change in  the proportion  of  itemizers  moves this 
measure of  price by  only about 28 percent as much as it moves the 
NWO measure of price. Given this interpretation, the $4,200 parameter 
in the APFV model has almost exactly the same meaning as the $1,200 
parameter in the NWO model. 
Second, the APFV measure of price rises as itemizers’ marginal tax 
rates fall, but a one percentage point fall in tax rates moves the price 
only by  the percentage of  voters itemizing, or about 0.5 percentage 
points. Thus, a one percentage point fall in the average marginal tax 
rate faced by itemizers would lower the level of personal taxes by about 
$21. As a rule of thumb, it would take a 5 percentage point rise in tax 
rates, equivalent to nearly a 20 percent income tax surcharge, to raise 
state and local personal  taxes per capita by  $100. The same change 
could be accomplished by  an 8 percentage point change in the share 
of voters who itemize. 
Table 5.2 presents the same set of regressions as table  1 except that 
personal and business taxes together form the dependent variable. Once 
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the planner model. The R2 terms are higher on the NWO and APFV 
regressions than on the WAP regressions. Also, the first-dollar measure 
of price again is inferior to the imputed national average instrument. 
The results in table 5.2 also mirror those in table 5.1 regarding the 
relative sizes of the NWO and APFV parameter values. This is some- 
what surprising as it implies that increases in the price of personal taxes 
will not significantly alter the level of business taxes. In other words, 
the expected drop in personal taxes when the price of such taxes rises, 
will  not  be  offset  by  increases in  business taxes.  Since only direct 
business taxes are measured here, it does not mean that indirect taxes 
such as user charges will  not be  substituted for lower personal  tax 
revenue. 
A comparison  of  tables  5.1 and  5.2  also produces  an  interesting 
conclusion about the use of business taxes as a revenue source. Al- 
though the parameter value is rarely significant, all  18 regressions of 
personal taxes per capita have a negative sign for the per capita income 
parameter. This suggests that, other things equal, personal  taxes are 
lower in higher-income states than in lower-income states. By contrast, 
the per capita income parameter has a positive  sign in  16 of the  18 
regressions in  which business and personal taxes form the dependent 
variable. Taken together, it seems that upper-income states clearly rely 
more on business taxes than do lower-income states. 
This calls for a reinterpretation of the Tiebout model with regard to 
firms. One possibility is that firms are unable to move easily, and can 
therefore be  heavily taxed. A second possibility is  that low-income 
states deliberately maintain low business taxes in order to attract new 
firms while high-income states need not be as aggressive in attracting 
new sources of  employment. 
The existence of nonpersonal, nonbusiness sources of revenue does 
little to change the basic relationships among tax revenue, income, and 
price. However, the addition of these variables to the regressions pro- 
duces the surprising result of very little substitution of these other forms 
of  revenue for personal and business taxes. For example, the regres- 
sions show that each dollar of federal aid and interest received lowers 
personal taxes by  between 3 cents and 8 cents, while the sum of per- 
sonal and business taxes actually rises by between 14 and 21 cents with 
each dollar of federal aid and interest received! The addition of other 
own-source revenue implies that personal plus business taxes rise only 
about  4  or 5  cents per  dollar received  while personal  taxes fall  by 
between 2 and 3 cents per dollar received. 
This data suggests that, at the margin, other own-source revenue 
largely substitutes for business taxes. As these other forms of tax are 
roughly as large as federal aid and interest, the coefficients mean that 
other revenue reduces direct business taxes by  about 10 cents on the 164  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
dollar. Still, all of these results are strikingly low. The frequent claim 
that a new excise is being introduced to “hold the line” on other taxes 
is given a new interpretation: the new excise will mean that personal 
taxes will be just as high as they otherwise would have been. 
5.4.2  Deductibility and the Type of Taxes 
The preceding section showed that higher costs for raising personal 
taxes lower the level of personal taxes raised, other things equal. This 
section examines the effect of tax deductibility on the choice of which 
type of personal tax is used. While most  states raise personal  taxes 
from each of the three major sources of taxation-income,  retail sales, 
and real estate-the  mix of taxes used varies substantially among the 
states. 
Per capita levels of sales, income, and residential property tax rev- 
enues were regressed against the same variables as were personal and 
personal plus business taxes in tables 5.1 and 5.2. Weighted average 
price measures were dropped because of the endogeneity of the weights 
with the type of tax used. In each case, the sum of federal aid plus 
interest received was used to control for other revenue sources. The 
results are summarized in table 5.3. 
The data show radically different explanations for the three types of 
taxes analyzed: sales, income, and residential real estate. The models 
are not very good at predicting the level of sales or income taxes, but 
the R2 value is quite good in the case of  residential real estate taxes. 
In the case of  sales taxes, the R2 values  show that only about one 
quarter of the variation in the data is explained by the model. None of 
the estimated parameters is statistically significant. This suggests that 
the sales tax  may  be  a  “default”  tax, only collected  if  there  is no 
attractive alternative. 
Income tax collections are negatively correlated with the price of 
taxation in a statistically significant manner. An increase of one per- 
centage point  in  the fraction of taxpayers  itemizing produces an $8 
increase in  the amount of income taxes collected per capita. By con- 
trast, a cut in the APFV measure of price produces about $27 more in 
income taxes. 
As in  the case of the NWO and APFV parameters in the total tax 
regressions, these $8 and $27 figures are essentially equivalent. A one 
percentage point increase in the proportion of voters itemizing would 
raise the NWO measure by one point, but the APFV measure by only 
the itemizers’ marginal tax rate. As this rate is approximately 28 per- 
cent, the net change in income taxes is about $8 by either measure. 
By contrast, a one percentage point increase in the itemizers’ marginal 
tax  rate  would  lower  the  APFV  measure by  the  fraction of  voters 
itemizing, or roughly one-half of  1 percent. In turn, this would imply 
an increase in income tax revenue of  about $13 per capita. 165  Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes 
Table 5.3  Regression Results for Type of  Personal Tax  Levied Using Various 
Measures of  Price 
Measure of  Price 
Variable  NWOl  NW02  APFV I  APFV2 
Dependent Variable: Sales Taxes per Capita 
Intercept 
INCOME P.C. 
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R2 
-  94 
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-  44 
19 







Dependent Variable: Income Taxes per Capita 
-  1063 
-  0.01 









-  0.06 
-  184 






























-  4.29 
-  10 
I 
-  10 
0.310 
1752 
-  0.00 
-0.12 









Dependent Variable: Residential Real Estate Taxes per Capita 
3817* 
-  0.01 
-0.13* 





-  12 
6 
-  12 
0.365 
3934* 
-  0.02 
-0.13* 
-2714 
-  14 
0.09 
-  0.27 

















-  344 




-  0.46 






-  18 
0.04* 
-  0.02 
-  161 
24 
~  0.46 






-  984 
0.04* 
-  0.03 
847 
20 
-  0.48 
-  2.42 







-  0.02 
-  1254 
23 
-  0.43 
-  2.65 
-  1.26 
-7 
13 
~  7* 
0.661 
Nore: An (*) indicates significance at 95% confidence interval. 166  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
Income taxes are the most efficient revenue source to pass on to the 
federal government since the amount collected from each taxpayer rises 
with the taxpayer’s federal tax rate. Progressive tax systems may be 
imposed at the state level with actual burdens which may be quite close 
to proportional. 
In spite of the advantages of progressivity within a state, there is no 
evidence that the income tax  is distributed in a progressive  fashion 
among the states. In fact, the high positive intercept term (significant 
in the APFV model) and negative, if  insignificant, per capita income 
coefficient ensure that income tax collections take a smaller share of 
personal  income in  high-income states than in  low-income states. In 
general, the level of income within a state is a poor explanator of the 
level of the state’s income tax collections. 
By contrast, residential real estate taxes are quite closely tied to the 
level of income in the state. The low and insignificant intercept terms 
in  these regressions  coupled  with the  statistically  significant income 
coefficients suggests that residential real estate collections are roughly 
proportional to income across the states. The price effect is not sig- 
nificant and is of indeterminant sign. 
5.4.3  Voting Behavior of  State Congressional Delegations 
The Tax Reform Act of  1986 greatly reduced the federal subsidy of 
state and local tax collections, and eroded the political base for state 
and local spending. This reduction in federal tax subsidies occurred in 
three ways. First, the deductibility of state and local sales taxes was 
eliminated. As map 5.2 indicated, sales taxes are the largest source of 
personal tax revenue in  25 states. Second, the tax reform act substan- 
tially reduced the proportion of voters who will itemize their tax re- 
turns.  This is due to the elimination of  some deductions and to the 
increase in  the standard deduction, the threshold  level of deductions 
needed to become an itemizer. Third, the tax reform act reduced tax 
rates, thereby cutting the effective federal subsidy for those taxpayers 
who itemize. 
The effect of  this on the cost of  state and local tax deductions is 
illustrated by a series of maps. Map 5.6 shows the change in the fraction 
of  voters itemizing in  each state. The map indicates that this change 
is substantial everywhere, with one voter in six switching from itemizer 
status to nonitemizer. The preceding results showed that the proportion 
of voters itemizing was a statistically significant indicator of  the level 
of  state and local taxes collected. 
Map 5.7 evaluates the proportionate reduction in the federal subsidy 
of state and local tax collections. The map shows that roughly half of 
the subsidy which existed under old law is eliminated. Generally states 
in the North with progressive income tax systems fare the best, while Map 5.6  Decrease in voters itemizing. (Map by Andy Mitrusi) Map 5.7  Per capita change in federal subsidy of state and local taxes. 
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states which rely on sales taxes for their revenue fare the worst. The 
results in map 5.7 may be viewed as overly dramatic. In terms of the 
weighted average price of revenue, a decline in the federal subsidy of 
50 percent typically means a rise in the price from  85 cents to 92.5 
cents. Thus, even the dramatic reductions in the federal subsidy should 
be interpreted as price increases on the order of  10 percent. 
Map 5.8 shows the effect of the tax changes on the per capita level 
of federal subsidy of personal taxes. Here the effect of the tax reform 
is shown as much more modest. The roughly $11 billion reduction in 
the federal subsidy is spread among some 230 million people, producing 
an average per capita change of about $50. This amounts to about 3 
percent of state and local personal tax revenue. 
Map 5.9 shows the per capita decrease in federal income taxes in 
the various states. As the map shows, some states will  show net tax 
increases. This is because the bill is revenue neutral overall. Personal 
taxes are cut while corporate taxes are increased.  In this study, the 
difference between personal taxes under the old law and personal taxes 
under the new law was taken as the amount of corporate tax increase. 
This increase was apportioned among taxpayers according to the amount 
of  dividends they received. The corporate tax increase was therefore 
allocated among the states in proportion to the dividends received by 
taxpayers in each state. Fully 23  states will see a rise in their federal 
taxes under this bill. 
Clearly the effect of the Tax Reform Act varied substantially among 
the states. Several indicators of this differential effect were considered. 
The primary motivation for congressmen was assumed to be the impact 
on their states overall. The impact of the tax reform bill on the cost of 
raising revenue for state and local spending was viewed as a secondary, 
“special interest” concern. A two-stage modeling procedure was there- 
fore undertaken, first to obtain the primary motivations for congres- 
sional  voting,  and  then  to  add  the  effect  of  state  and  local  tax 
deductibility. 
First, we constructed a voter model of the tax reform bill. The NBER 
TAXSIM model was used to compute each taxpayer’s taxes under the 
old law and under the new law.  If  a taxpayer’s taxes declined by  at 
least 0.2 percent of income, the votes assigned to that taxpayer were 
counted as voting yes on the tax reform bill. If  the taxpayer’s taxes 
increased by at least 0.2 percent of income, the votes assigned to that 
taxpayer were counted as voting no on the tax reform bill. Other voters 
were assumed to abstain. The votes were tabulated on a state-by-state 
basis for comparison with the votes of the congressional delegation. 
The second model of the impact of the tax bill was the ratio of new 
tax revenue to old tax revenue. For this purpose two measures were 
devised: the change in personal taxes only, and the change in personal 
taxes when the added corporate tax was imputed to individuals. Map 5.8  Decline in federal subsidy of state and local taxes. (Map by 
Andy Mitrusi) n  INCREASE  UP  TO  $50  OVER  $50 
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Congressional delegations were divided along party  lines. The de- 
pendent variable was the fraction of the congressional delegation voting 
against  the  tax  reform  bill.  This fraction was  regressed  on various 
combinations of the variables described above. As the tax reform bill 
was largely a committee compromise bill, the members  of  the tax- 
writing committees were not counted in measuring the fraction of  the 
delegation voting on the bill. 
The  voting  of  Republican  congressional  delegations  was  not  ex- 
plained in  a statistically  significant manner by  any of the variables, 
either separately, or in combination. In view of the distributional effects 
of the tax bill, constituent pressure would be likely to incline Repub- 
lican voters to oppose the tax bill. In addition, Republicans were gen- 
erally excluded  from the tax-writing process under the majoritarian 
rules of the House of Representatives. On the other hand, Republicans 
were under pressure from the president to support the bill. Republican 
voting was therefore determined more by conflicting political pressure 
than by the economic variables considered here. 
The voting of  Democratic congressional delegations was explained 
by the economic impact variables, although the results were not clear- 
cut. Democrats’ opposition to the tax  bill  was positively correlated 
with the rise in taxes in their state. Generally, a  I  percent rise in the 
ratio of new taxes to old taxes increased opposition in the congressional 
delegation by about 3 percent. Democrats were more sensitive to the 
change in personal taxes alone, than the change in taxes which included 
the “pass-through”  of the corporate tax increase. A  I  percent increase 
in  personal  taxes  reduced  support by  3.2 percent, but  a  1 percent 
increase in  total taxes reduced  support by  only 2.8 percent.  At the 
margin, the corporate tax increase pass-through had very little effect 
on Democrats’ voting behavior. This may reflect either a belief in the 
“corporate veil” or an economic expectation that the pass-through was 
not paid by  the constituents that Democrats represent. 
Surprisingly, the voter referendum variable was negatively correlated 
with the vote of the congressional delegation. Generally, a  1 percent 
increase in the opposition to the tax reform among the voters decreased 
opposition among the Democratic congressional  delegation by  about 
1.6 percent. The standard errors on these coefficients were marginal 
to insignificant, however, ranging from 50 to 70 percent of the parameter 
estimate. 
Three explanations for this phenomenon are possible. First, major- 
ities supported the tax reform bill in the TAXSIM referendum in all 50 
states. Thus, a median voter model would suggest that an increase in 
marginal opposition would have no effect on the outcome.  Second, 
given the distributional considerations of the tax reform bill, opposition 
was likely to be concentrated among constituents supporting the other 173  Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes 
party.  Finally, voter  surveys at the time indicated  that most  voters 
thought their taxes would go up, in contrast to the findings of TAXSIM. 
This would indicate that the TAXSIM referendum procedure did not 
reflect the underlying views of constituents, regardless of whether it 
was TAXSIM or the constituents who were in error. 
Those models which produced  statistically significant variables for 
explaining the behavior of Democratic congressional delegations were 
used to see if changes in the state and local tax situation had any effect. 
Changes in the likelihood of itemizing, in the average price facing vot- 
ers, and in the weighted average prices of personal and total taxes were 
tried. None produced statistically significant results. Generally the stan- 
dard errors were five to ten times the parameter estimates. Nor was 
any consistent sign discernible on the results. It is reasonable to con- 
clude therefore, that the effect of the tax reform bill on state and local 
taxes had very little impact on congressional voting. This is particularly 
true about the effect of the tax reform bill on the price of raising state 
and local revenue. This is a surprising result  in  light of  the intense 
lobbying on this matter by  state and local public officials and public 
employee unions. 
5.5  Conclusion 
The results presented here provide a number of conclusions regarding 
the effects of  state and local tax deductibility and the mechanism by 
which this is transformed by representative governments: 
The level  of  state and  local  spending  is  significantly affected  by 
deductibility. 
The effect of deductibility is stronger on voter-based measures than 
on aggregate measures of cost. 
Income tax collections per capita were quite sensitive to the price of 
raising revenue. Low prices were associated with increased use of 
income taxes. 
Property taxes were insensitive to price, but were closely related to 
personal income. 
Sales taxes  were  not  easily explained  by  economic variables  and 
appear to be a residual form of revenue. 
Congressional voting seems more influenced by aggregate effects than 
by  voter-based measures, unlike state and local spending. 
Given the substantial changes in the value of federal deductibility of 
state and local taxes, future researchers have the prospect of sufficient 
variability in time-series data to test a number of hypotheses suggested 
by the cross-sectional data presented here. 174  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
Note 
1. Turnout by income group was computed using exit poll information pub- 
lished  in Public Opinion (December 1984-January  1985) and compared with 
the distribution of income on tax returns using TAXSIM. 
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Comment  Daniel Feenberg 
Because the publication version of this paper answers the more sig- 
nificant points  raised  in  the original discussion  these comments are 
limited to a few minor points. 
First, in the regressions of state and local tax revenues on their after 
federal  tax  price  Lindsey  adopts improved  instruments for the  ob- 
viously endogenous tax  price  terms.  These improvements take into 
account  the  potentially  deductible expenses of  the  nonitemizer  and 
provide  an  increase in efficiency over simpler instruments  used  by 
Feldstein and Metcalf. The statistically significant results are certainly 
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welcome but the new instruments are not required for unbiased coef- 
ficient estimates. While the instruments used by Feldstein and Metcalf 
are certainly biased estimates of actual tax prices, this would not, in 
and  of  itself,  lead  to biased  coefficients in  the second  stage of  the 
regression, as the paper implies. 
Given the relatively few degrees of freedom available and the plau- 
sibility (to me) of the results presented in table 5.1, I hesitate to suggest 
additional explanatory variables, yet the religious composition of states 
is readily available and might be an important determinant of the taste 
for public spending. 
The regression  predicting the voting behavior of  Democratic con- 
gressmen on the Tax  Reform Act of  1986 (TRA) is easily the most 
surprising (and interesting) result in the paper. In the regressions each 
state is an observation and the dependent variable is the proportion of 
Democratic representatives voting for the act. Lindsey calculates the 
number of voters in each state whose taxes will be raised or lowered 
significantly by the TRA and holds a mock referendum. The referendum 
result however has no explanatory power. Nor does the effect of the 
TRA on the after federal tax price of state and local revenues seem to 
have any effect on congressmen. The only effect seems to come from 
the TRAs effect on per capita federal tax liabilities. The obvious con- 
clusion is that the congressmen were responding to regional interests 
while ignoring class interests normally thought to be very powerful. 
This result can be questioned on a number of grounds, including omitted 
variables, the presence of strategic voting and logrolling, the use of an 
inappropriate linear probability model, and the absence of formal hy- 
pothesis testing, but it remains a thought-provoking result. 